DAVID HUME AND THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF EMPIRICISM by IONUŢ ŞTEFAN
 
 
 
DAVID HUME AND THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION 
OF EMPIRICISM  
 
IONUŢ ŞTEFAN
  
 
 
Abstract:  The  research  is  related  to  David  Hume.  This  philosopher  is 
described as being an empiricist, but it should be noted that the empiricism 
promoted by Hume represents the development up to the final consequences 
of this philosophical doctrine that should be subjected to the observability 
requirement. The core problem for Hume’s philosophy is the difficulty of 
causality  thinking.  The  Scottish  philosopher  promotes  a  moderate  and 
inconsistent skepticism because he does not doubt the permanency of facts. 
The Humean epistemology is mixed with elements belonging to some naïve 
ontology  of  a  materialistic  nature  and  with  elements  of  a  sensualistic 
psychology of an associationist type. The causality or the causal connection 
between events is based on a psychological belief, which has a pragmatic end 
for people, in that it offers us the psychological comfort of habitual events 
and  the  familiar  existential.  Causality  refers  to  certain  events  that  have 
already happened in a certain way, but it cannot constitute a necessary and 
sufficient basis for similar future events.  
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INTRODUCTION  
In  the  case  of  empiricism  as  a  philosophical  orientation,  the  most 
interesting, is the David Hume “case”. The fundamental problem for 
his philosophical doctrine is the issue of causality. I shall consider that 
Hume promotes a radical empiricism (centered on the requirement to 
reduce all ideas and on the requirement of observability), a moderate 
and inconsistent skepticism (does not doubt the permanency of facts), 
and  a  naive  materialistic  ontology  in  terms  of  a  sensualistic  and 
associationistic  psychology.  Hume  does  not  reject  causality,  but 
engages  in  examining  the  possibility  of  a  rational  and  sensorial 
legitimacy of predicting future events based on the so called causal 
connection required. The result of his research is negative. It cannot be 
proven reasonably, by any demonstration, or by resorting to sensory 
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experience,  that  the  causal  link  truly  exists  and  that  it  would  bear 
necessity.  The  causal  link  between  events  is  simply  faith,  which 
probably for pragmatic reasons, people will never give up. A question 
may be asked: is Hume’s empiricism more radical than Locke’s?  
 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF MODERN EMPIRICISM  
Empiricists have started from researching the nature of our ideas. Both 
Locke  and  Hume  have  raised  the  question  of  the  formation  of  our 
ideas, whether ideas are innate (the Cartesian rationalist version, for 
example)  or  acquired.  If  our  ideas  are  innate,  then  behaviorism  is 
deprived of its support. If our ideas are acquired through senses, then 
inneism is no longer justified, no longer founded. Locke and Hume 
chose  the  latter  option.  They  have  at  least  two  things  in  common: 
fighting inneism and the origin of ideas. While in the first case, both 
take the same stand, in the second one, the structure is the same yet 
with some differences. It seems that Locke took a stronger and more 
explicit stand in combating inneism. He was concerned with proving 
the groundlessness of the so called theory of innate ideas, trying to 
show that experience is the source of all our ideas.
1 Locke believes that 
it is necessary to renounce not only to the incorr ect thesis stating that 
there are ready-made ideas since birth, but also the pseudo ideas and 
prejudices that still master the human mind as immutable principles.
2 
Rejecting inneism strengthens the thesis of the empirical origin of 
ideas; at birth, the human mind is like a white sheet of paper  (blank 
slate), on which there is nothing written; all the elements of reason and 
knowledge  are  taken  from  experience  alone.
3 Hume starts from the 
same stand that Fr. Bacon and Locke have departed from: experience.
4 
Hegel noticed that David Hume rejects innate ideas; experience, as the 
only source of ideas, resides in perception.  
  Locke identifies two sources of knowledge: the first one is the 
external sense or sensation. It seems that “ideas emerging on this path 
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have  a  maximum  cognitive  value,  because  they  correspond  to  the 
things they refer to.”
5 The second source of knowledge is the internal 
sense  or  reflection  by  which  the  mind  gets  ideas  reflecting  on  its 
internal  processes.  Hume  also  identifies  two  sources  of  human 
knowledge: 1) Impressions (all emotions more vivid and stronger) and 
2) Thoughts or ideas (the less powerful and alive, they are less intense 
than  ideas).  However,  an  important  difference  between  Hume  and 
Locke concerning the issue of the two sources of human knowledge 
may  be  noticed.  With  Hume  it  relates  to  the  requirement  of 
reducibility: all our ideas are reduced to impressions. In other words, 
each  idea  must  have  a  corresponding  impression.
6  With  Locke, 
although the first source is the sensation, it  is not necessary that the 
entire knowledge come down to this. Locke himself says that there are 
only two sources of knowledge: sensation or reflection.  
  The term “experience” has two meanings with Hume.
7 The first 
one refers to the origin of ideas in impression, thus opposing apriorism, 
and the second one refers to the real world phenomena as a whole and 
the relationships among these phenomena (the issue of causality). The 
objective  value  of  knowledge  is  given  by  the  impressions 
corresponding to ideas. We  only perceive specific features but we do 
not perceive the essence. Thus, the logical consequence of empiricism 
reaches  its  climax  through  Hume.  He  developed  the  empiricist 
philosophy of Locke and Berkeley  “to its logical conclusion”.
8 Three 
components may be indicated in Hume’s argumentation: ontological, 
psychological, and epistemological.  
 
DAVID HUME’S ONTOLOGY  
David  Hume  did  not  propose  to  himself  to  develop  what  we  call 
ontology. He accepts as unproblematic the common sense views about 
existence. Existence is multiple and diverse; in other words, it holds 
quantity  and  quality.  The  quantity  of  existence  consists  in  the 
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multitude of objects, the quality, in differentiating their determinations. 
Objects  have  characteristics  (shape,  size,  and  so  on).  As  some 
characteristics  are  manifested,  while  others  are  cryptic  (“hidden 
powers”), existence is defined by ontological depth. The objects are 
next to each other, some on top of others; therefore they have a spatial 
display.  The  configuration  of  the  display  of  objects  in  relation  to 
spatial structure is given; existence is characterized by exteriority and 
ontological neutrality. It would be even if man were not. The human 
body with all its organs (eyes, ears, skin, etc.) also belongs to this 
complete outer world. Between the objects external to the body and the 
organs external to the soul there is a relationship: the first act upon the 
latter.  
  Objects are active, organs are passive. Organs have a single 
function,  to  receive,  to  bear  the  action  of  objects.  Responsiveness 
makes sense only when the organs are functional, the term “deaf ears”, 
for instance, is improper because that part of the body that is shaped 
like a funnel hanging on one side of the head cannot get sound signals. 
The actional relationship between objects and human organs is causal: 
the  intensity  of  subjective  effects  is  directly  proportional  to  the 
intensity of the characteristics of objects. It is, just like the existence of 
reality,  unproblematic  for  Hume.  As  far  as  the  objects  are 
quantitatively distinguished they are matters. The objectual ontology of 
the Scottish philosopher does not differ in any way from the naive 
materialistic beliefs of common sense. This tradition of commonsense 
philosophy has worked its way up in the British area.  
 
DAVID HUME’S PSYCHOLOGY  
Hume’s  psychology  is  sensualistic  and  associationistic.  He 
distinguishes among three psychic instances: sensitivity, memory, and 
imagination.  At  sensitivity  level  impressions  are  formed,  in  the 
memory ideas are stored, while imagination combines and recombines 
the materials memorized.  
  Impressions are reflections of the features of objects (external 
sensations), but also affective (“we love”, “we hate”) and volitional 
experiences (“we want”, “we desire”). Impressions form the class of 
originating  experiences.  Hume  does  not  describe  how  external 
impressions are formed, namely, what happens when objects meet with 
sensory  organs.  We  have  seen  above  that  objects  differ  in  quantity 
(size)  and  quality  (have  different  determinations);  in  their  turn, 
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gradation. Impressions differ from each other in intensity and vivacity; 
the impression produced by a smaller number of actions of an object is 
weaker and less vivid than the impression produced by a large number 
of  actions  of  the  same  object.  This  means  that  the  gradation  of 
impressions  should  not  be  placed  in  direct  correspondence  to  the 
ontological gradation, but to the number of the actions of objects upon 
the senses; the intensity and vividness of impressions are determined 
by the frequency of the sensory contacts of the epistemic subject with 
objects. Apart from a few sporadic indications (“we hear”, “we see”, 
“we touch”), Hume does not operate a systematic grouping of the types 
of impressions,  depending on the stimulated body organ or  another 
criterion; at the same time, he does not make any statement concerning 
the status of impressions, whether they are isolated from one another 
or  whether  they  are  related.  However,  we  can  suspect  that  he 
establishes a bi-univocal correspondence by default between the set of 
external impressions and the set of the attributes of objects, on one 
hand,  and  between  the  set  of  internal  impressions  and  the  set  of 
affective  and  volitional  states,  on  the  other  hand.  Hume  thereby 
decrees  the  prohibition  of  the  appearance  of  any  impression  the 
external or internal origin of which cannot be unequivocally indicated.  
  Ideas are simple copies of impressions, so they will be paler.
9 
Hume does not specify what we should understand by  “idea”, images 
(representations)  or  relations  between  images;  instead,  he  specifies 
how ideas appear. There are three principles of association: similarity, 
space-time  contiguity,  and  causality.  One  might  say  that  this  is  a 
vicious  circle.  As  principles  of  association  of  ideas  they  should  be 
ideas,  at  their  turn;  in  order  to  be  able  to  take  form,  they  need  to 
assume themselves. Hume does not discuss about these principles and 
does not refute their legitimacy because, probably, he thinks of them as 
a given mechanism. If they are given then they are either innate (which 
would force him to accept inneism) or regularities necessary to things 
(which  would  force  him  to  reconsider  his  approach  concerning  the 
necessary  connections).  These  principles  exert  two  functions: 
generating  ideas  by  associating  impressions  and  associating  simple 
ideas and so generating composed ideas.  
  While memory registers, preserves, and allows the update of 
ideas, imagination is defined by a degree of activism; it combines and 
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recombines  ideas.  The  resulting  ideas,  sometimes  very  bizarre,  are 
stored  in  memory  as  well.  Supplied  from  two  sources,  memory 
contains,  therefore,  two  types  of  ideas:  some,  exact  replicas  of 
impressions, others, products of imagination. On both, Hume imposes 
the requirement of reducibility: any idea must be able to be reduced 
(“decomposed”)  to  impressions.  Simple  ideas  are  reduced  directly, 
composed ones, indirectly. In its turn, each impression must be able to 
be reduced to an attribute of an object or an emotional experience. This 
way  knowledge  in  its  entirety  is  organized  in  a  pyramidal  manner, 
impressions at the base and the most general and abstract ideas at the 
top.  
  Between the ontological and the psychological planes, there is 
certain  symmetry:  relations  between  facts  correspond  to  relations 
between  impressions.  The  first  are  causes,  the  others,  effects.  At  a 
subjective level we may ascertain the simultaneity and succession of 
impressions. As the first feature seems unproblematic, Hume examines 
the other. Succession involves temporality, designated by terms such 
as  “first  of  all”,  “before”,  “then”,  “after”,  etc.  We  assume  that  at 
instance  T1  impression  A  is  produced,  and  then  at  instance  T2 
impression B is produced. Let us call the first impression “fire” and the 
second  one  “smoke”.  Both  impressions  respect  the  intersubjective 
testability requirement, meaning that any witness can prove that at T1 
there is an object called “fire” and at T2 there is another object called 
“smoke”. In terms of empiricism, the above requirement can be more 
accurately called: observability requirement. It is a severe requirement 
and it indicates Hume’s radical stand. Neither of the two impressions 
violates  this  requirement.  No  other  impression  can  be  indicated 
between the two impressions. Establishing the sequence can therefore 
be concisely formulated as “fire, then smoke”. While examining their 
succession we do not gain any indication concerning the connection 
between them. Moreover, the impression called “smoke” is completely 
different from the impression called “fire”. No matter how much we 
analyze the qualities of the first impression (shape, color, etc.), we find 
none to suggest that it would be, in any way, generating the second 
impression; similarly no analysis can identify, among the qualities of 
the impression called “smoke”, any indication that would suggest it 
was caused by the first impression.  
  However,  the  statement  “fire  causes  smoke”  is  accepted 
without  restraint  in  common  knowledge,  science,  and  philosophy. 
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the  necessary  connection  does  not  legitimize  either  a  priori  or  a 
posteriori. If the principle of causality is based on experience, then 
there  is  no  impression  corresponding  to  the  idea  of  a  necessary 
connection between cause and effect. In fact, Hume states that a single 
experience cannot provide us with the idea of necessary connection, 
and more experiences show us only the events in sequence. For Hume 
it is clear that a third impression apart from the two does not exist; 
therefore, we cannot prove in any way that, in reality, there is a link 
between fire and smoke. Should such an impression exist, it would 
have to comply with the observability requirement.  
  In this case, either the causal link is an invention without a 
counterpart  in  reality,  or  it  is  an  idea  formed  by  an  incorrect  or 
unexpected operation of the psychological mechanisms of association. 
To  clarify  this  issue,  Hume  examines  the  genesis  of  the  idea  of 
connection. Following a single impact between an object and a sense 
organ, no impression occurs and therefore, no idea; the impact is called 
“experience”. Only a large number of similar experiences can generate 
an  impression,  thus  the  impression  becoming  an  idea;  the  greater 
number of experiences, the more intense impressions and ideas. Two 
emotional  states  are  associated  with  the  impression  induced  in  this 
manner: habit (which may be an  effect of repetition) and faith. An 
objection might be formulated: if habit is, as Hume seems to consider 
it, an effect of the repeated sequence of events, then the causal link 
insinuates itself in the argumentation as assumption. The term “faith”, 
in this instance, is not synonymous with “suspicion”. Suspicion admits 
probability  and  hence  uncertainty  and  contingency.  Faith  is  the 
indicative of absolute subjective certainty, the firm conviction in the 
strict determinism of the world. Habit and faith create a horizon of 
expectations centered on the similarity of future and past.
10 The faith in 
similarity cannot be proven, though, because the future cannot be 
experienced. All these subjective elements induced by the repeated 
successions of experienced facts are combined and recombined in 
imagination, resulting in the idea of necessary co nnection: “therefore, 
this connection that we feel in spirit, this usual passing of imagination 
from  one  object  to  the  usually  accompanying  one  is  the  feeling  or 
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impression  from  which  we  form  the  idea  of  power  or  necessary 
connection. Nothing more is hidden here”.
11  
  The  genesis  of  the  idea  of  necessary  connection  is  thus 
explained  by  the  combinatorial  action  of  imagination  that  uses 
impressions and heterogeneous states; as it is not reducible to a clear 
and distinct impression of connection and as it does not comply with 
the  observability  requirement,  it  cannot  prove  its  ontological 
foundation.  
 
DAVID HUME’S EPISTEMOLOGY  
In  the  case  of  the  epistemological  dimension,  Hume  distinguishes 
between  two  categories  of  “objects  of  human  research”:  relations 
between ideas and relations between facts. From this point of view, 
Hume would anticipate Kant. Moreover, in slightly different forms, the 
distinction appears with Hobbes and Leibniz as well.  
  The first type of relations is specific to formal sciences, Hume 
indicating geometry, algebra, and arithmetic. The main feature of these 
relations is that they are factually neutral. Their truth is analytically 
determined  (by  simple  operations  of  thinking)  without  resorting  to 
facts. To clarify the issue of the causal connection, the examination of 
these relations is irrelevant, in Hume’s view. The basic characteristic 
of the other relations is that they can be factually refuted: “the opposite 
of any fact is always possible”.
12 Invalidation can occur only through 
sensory experience; the term “experience” is used only in this narrow 
sense by Hume. In psychological terms, Hume proves that the idea of 
causal  connection  is  only  a  product  of  human  imagination  and  one 
cannot prove it by sensorial means; the habit of thinking that one fact 
is caused by another takes the form of reifying protection. The man 
reifies by projection on reality, a figment of his imagination. In the 
epistemological component of his philosophy, Hume argues against the 
idea that future events can be predicted on the base of the unfounded 
necessity of the causal relation. From the perspective of contemporary 
and modern philosophy, Hume’s argumentation can be reconstructed 
in the following manner without altering the philosophical thought.  
  If the causal relationship really existed, (in re and not only in 
mente) and if, in addition, it were also necessary, then the statement 
that would express it would be universal. In terms already consecrated 
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(Kant, Popper, etc.) it should possess strict universality; meaning  it 
should  be  valid  for  past,  present,  and  future  events.  Only  such  a 
statement would allow for the prediction of future events. The issue of 
examining the idea of causal connection will be reformulated, in this 
case, as an issue of the possibility to rationally legitimize the universal 
statement  strictly  relating  to  causality.  In  relation  with  the 
psychological  approach  placed  in  the  context  of  the  genesis,  this 
approach lies within the context of the foundation.  
  The succession of two events, A and B, “B succeeds A” in a 
single  experience  can  be  described  by  a  unique  statement.  From  a 
unique statement a universal statement cannot be inferred. In Hume’s 
words, a single case does not generate any impressions and therefore 
no  idea  of  causal  connection  is  possible.  The repeated  sequence  of 
events A and B can be described by a class of singular statements. It 
seems that this is the case covered by Hume. Repetition produces an 
impression, and the impression produces an idea. From several unique 
statements  a  universal  statement  can  be  inferred.  Is  it  also  strictly 
universal?  It  can  take  the  shape:  “in  all  the  experiences  so  far,  B 
followed  A”.  Every  singular  statement  expressing  the  sequence  “A 
then B” is true. From the set of singular true statements, we infer the 
truth  of  the  universal  statement.  This  universality,  however,  is 
empirical. The empirical proposition cannot guarantee anything about 
the  future.  Extending  its  validity  over  future  events  is  therefore 
unlawful.  A  strict  universal  statement  concerning  the  succession  of 
events cannot be inferred from a universal empiric statement. While 
the latter is true, the first could only be likely because the false implies 
anything.  This  results  from  the  truth  table  of  the  composed  logical 
sentence called “logical implication”.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
We have seen that, in psychological terms, this situation takes the form 
of unfounded faith in the similarity of future and past. No matter how 
great  the  frequency  of  repetition  of  the  sequence  of  events  and  no 
matter how strong our feeling of safety would be, predicting future 
events based on past experiences is fundamentally illegitimate. These 
would be the most important elements concerning the causality theory 
developed by Hume. The “enrolling” of this philosopher within the 
direction called empiricism must be nuanced. The Scottish philosopher 
seems  to  develop  until  the  last  consequences  the  manner  to  found 
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terrible  dispute  in  the  history  of  universal  philosophy,  between 
rationalism  and  empiricism,  is  still  “open”  –  as  Constantin  Noica 
considered  in  the  case  of  “open  concepts”.  Be  it  alone  the  dispute 
between Noam Chomsky and Jean Piaget concerning natural human 
language. Piaget rather takes an empiricist stand, because he considers 
that language is assimilated empirically in the first stage of life (if, for 
instance, we have a man who has not assimilated a natural language 
from birth until adolescence, like the scenario of The Jungle Book, he 
will  not  be  able  to  learn  any  form  of  natural  language),  while  the 
American  linguist  Chomsky  believes  that we can  talk about  certain 
innate  structures,  the  so-called  “universal  grammar”,  and  based  on 
these  structures  we  will  be  able  to  assimilate  a  natural  language 
individually.
13  
  The dispute between empiricism and rationalism is “mediated”, 
philosophically,  by  the  Kantian  critical  rationalism.  Immanuel  Kant 
has  called  his  philosophical  doctrine  ‘transcendental  idealism’.  The 
German transcendental idealism explicitly starts from David Hume’s 
philosophy, approaching rationalism in its “form of knowledge”, while 
the  “subject  of  knowledge”  will  always  be  given  empirically.  The 
rupture  that  had  occurred  between  the  classical  rationalism  of 
knowledge, represented by: Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza, and the 
classical English empiricism represented by: Locke, Berkeley, Bacon, 
and Hume, will be mediated by the German transcendental idealism.  
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